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Abstract: The end of  the  Second World War necessitated making arrangements as  to  the  future 
of Germany. The decisions were to be made by the allied countries – winners of the war. In the end, 
the decisions of  the  so-called “big four” states were of  arbitrary nature, and German officials were 
not permitted to participate in  talks about the  future of  their country. The years 1945-1947 have 
brought numerous important resolutions and final settlements, but were also a  period of  growing 
disagreement within the  victorious coalition. True end of  their collaboration came about in 1947, 
and the matter of Germany became a bargaining chip in the Cold War conflict. The aim of this study 
is, above all, to  present the  role of  the  most important decision-making institution after the  war: 
the Council of Foreign Ministers. The paper also presents the respective positions of the four great 
powers as  to  the  participation of  Germany, Poland and so-called “small countries” in  determining 
the future of Germany.
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1. INTRODUCTION
After the end of World War II, the decisions on the future of Germany were to be taken by 
the  four great victorious powers: the United States of America, United Kingdom, France 
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. They were to engage in  talks, negotiate and 
ultimately determine the territory, political system and future position of the new German 
state in the international arena. In order to achieve this objective, a special body consisting 
of  representatives of  the  four powers, whose task would be to  resolve contentious issues 
concerning not only Germany but also its wartime allies: Italy, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary 
and Finland, was to be established.
At the  conference in  Yalta, held between 4-11 February 1945, the  parties decided 
to create a permanent body, enabling regular meeting and consultations of  the respective 
foreign affairs ministers of the US, Great Britain and the Soviet Union. Stipulations on the 
subject were presented in  the  eighth chapter of  the Yalta Agreement. According to  these 
provisions, foreign ministers were to  meet every three-to-four months, in  turn in  each 
of  the  state capitals. London was selected as  the first location for such a  conference that 
was supposed to be held just after the founding conference of the United Nations in San 
Francisco, which took place between 25 April-26 June 1945 (Kocot, Wolfke, 1987, p. 63; 
Klafkowski, 1953, p. 129).
2. COUNCIL OF FOREIGN MINISTERS
Organizational principles of functioning of this new body, known henceforth as the Council 
of Foreign Ministers were, however, only determined at the conference in Potsdam, held from 
17 July to 2 August 1945. The proposal to create such a Council was submitted to Stalin 
and Churchill by the US President Harry Truman, and the principles of  its functioning 
were developed by the  American delegation to  the  conference (Mołotow, 1950, p.  66). 
According to  the  draft resolution on  its establishment, the  Council was to  be made up 
of foreign ministers of the five major powers: Britain, USSR, China, France and the USA. 
Both Winston Churchill and Joseph Stalin contested the participation of China in  talks 
on purely European issues. In fact, Stalin was not a supporter of establishing the Council at 
all. W. Churchill in his war memoirs recalls their conversation on this subject, and explains 
that Stalin had doubts about the participation of China in the council of foreign ministers. 
Why would China be involved in making decisions on matters concerning only European 
states? Stalin also believed that such a  new collegial body was not needed, especially 
since the European Advisory Commission had been established already. During the Yalta 
conference it had been also agreed that the three key foreign ministers would meet regularly – 
hence Stalin argued that setting up another organ would only complicate matters and hinder 
their quick resolution (Churchill, 1996, p. 325). According to Truman, on the other hand, 
China was to have a say in European matters because the state was a member of the UN 
Security Council. Ultimately, however, it was established that China was only to be involved 
in decisions on matters related to the Far East and the so-called “global issues”. Stalin also 
raised objections to  French participation in  the  talks. Eventually however, it  was agreed 
that France would take part only in the portion of debate concerning Italy and Germany 
(Zięba, 1981, p. 37). Moreover, as per the American proposition, London became the seat 
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of the joint secretariat of this new organ. Each minister of foreign affairs could be accompanied 
during Council deliberations by a deputy and a small group of experts. The first ministerial 
meeting was to take place no later than on 1 September 1945. The chief tasks of the Council 
were to be: conducting preparatory work in connection with conclusion of peace treaties, 
preparation and presentation to the United Nations of draft peace treaties with the former 
allies of the Third Reich during World War II, making decisions as to the future of Germany 
in the times of peace and presentation of draft peaceful resolutions of territorial conflicts 
in Europe (Makowski, 1946a, pp. 5-7, Klafkowski, 1953, pp. 130-131).
The main task of the Council of Foreign Ministers was the implementation of the Yalta 
and Potsdam agreements in  terms of  establishment of  a common position on  the future 
post-war order in the world. All individual issues, before they found their way to the peace 
conference table, had to first be discussed by the Council. Contentious issues could not be 
submitted by the Council for consideration during the peace conferences. The compromise 
decisions, taken by the Council on behalf of the great powers, were described by the Soviet 
delegation to the Paris Conference as a “minimum of justice”, which was to be handed out 
to all enemy states of the Allies during World War II (Klafkowski, 1953, pp. 130).
The Council was also obliged by the leaders of the victorious powers to invite repre-
sentatives of every country to participate in the talks in question whenever issues directly 
related to or of interest to that state were to be discussed. Moreover, it had at its disposal 
a number of subsidiary bodies and groups of specialists and experts, mainly in law, who were 
entrusted with preparation of reports on particular issues or elements thereof (Makowski, 
1946a, pp. 5-7).
After returning home, US President Harry Truman stated that Germany also suffered 
during the  World War II  – especially its civilian population, and now the  country bore 
the consequences of her past crimes. He declared that the German people were beginning 
to atone for the crimes of the gangsters whom they had placed in power, and whom they 
had wholeheartedly approved and obediently followed (Makowski, 1946b, p. 254). Truman 
further stressed that the Council established in Potsdam was going to be the continuous 
meeting ground of the five principal governments, on which they were to reach common 
understanding regarding the peace settlements. He strongly emphasized that the five gov-
ernments were not going to try to dictate to, or dominate, other nations. He continued, 
identifying the main duty of  the Council – to apply, so far as possible, the  fundamental 
principles of  justice underlying the  Charter of  the  United National adopted at the  San 
Francisco conference. The  work undertaken by the  Council was intended to  make pos-
sible speedier, more orderly, more efficient, and more cooperative peace settlements. Next, 
President Truman stressed that the matter of Italy was to be settled first, as it was the first 
country to break away from the Axis. Italy, in his opinion, contributed to the final defeat 
of Germany, and joined the allied forces in the war against Japan. He reasoned that a peace 
treaty with the Italian government would make it possible for Italy to become a member 
of the United Nations at a rapid pace. The American President further argued that the next 
objective for the Council of Foreign Ministers was to start the preparatory work for German 
peace settlements. However, its final acceptance – in his words – would have to wait until 
Germany has developed a government with which a peace treaty could be made. Until that 
time, pursuant to  the  specific political and economic principles laid down at the confer-
ence of Berlin, Germany was to be governed by the occupying powers. The main objective 
of all these actions was, according to Truman, to eliminate Nazism in Germany, to fully de-
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militarize the country and introduce true democracy. German industry was to be re-focused 
on agriculture and “peaceful industry”, so as  to make “concentration of  economic power 
in cartels and monopolies” impossible. Furthermore, he summarized, the five powers did 
not intend again to make the mistake of exacting reparations in money, and then having 
to lend Germany the monies with which to pay them. Reparations this time were to be paid 
in physical assets, leaving the German nation only with those resources not required for its 
peaceful existence (Makowski, 1946b, pp. 259-263).
Comments on the functioning of the Council were made not only by representatives 
of  the Western powers, but also those of  the Soviet Union, mainly in reaction to the  in-
creasing tension and disagreements between the previously allied countries on the matter 
of Germany. In 1948, in a note sent on 3 October 1948 by the Soviet Union to the United 
States, Britain and France, the Soviet power reminded the Western states of the preceding 
common agreements as to the tasks of the Council, notably including the discussion of all 
outstanding matters relating to  Berlin and all other pending issues regarding Germany 
as a whole (Makowski, 1948, pp. 834-835).
Work of  the  Council of  Foreign Ministers was usually preceded by preparatory 
conferences of deputy ministers, who set the agenda, agreed on the order of  topics to be 
discussed and drew up preliminary draft resolutions. 
Throughout the period of its existence in the years 1945-1949, the Council of Foreign 
Ministers met up six times:
–  London, 11 September-2 October 1945  – discussion covered the  issue of  peace 
treaties with the former allies of the Third Reich during World War II;
–  Paris, 25 April-16 May 1946 and 15 June-12 July 1946 – as in the case of the first 
conference, the  agenda included drawing up draft provisions and demands to be 
included in the respective peace treaties with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and 
Finland; also some issues related to Germany were raised;
–  New York, 4 November-12 December 1946 – the future of the disputed territory 
of Trieste was discussed;
–  Moscow, 10 March-24 April 1947 – conference devoted to resolution of the situation 
in Germany;
–  London 25 November-15 December 1947  – the  problem of  a peace treaty with 
Germany was raised. Both the Moscow and the London conferences were unsuccessful 
due to the growing conflict between the Western powers and the Soviet Union;
–  Paris 23 May-20 June 1949  – the  last conference of  the  Council of  Foreign 
Ministers – was in  fact a purely formal meeting. In view of  the absence of a real 
agreement between the former allies, the core issues – mainly the German problem – 
were not touched upon during the conference (Skibiński, 1987, p. 92).
The Council of Foreign Ministers of the great powers was primarily established to mon-
itor the implementation of  provisions of  the  Potsdam Agreement. The  peace treaties for 
the former allies of the Third Reich: Italy, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland were 
prepared pursuant to these provisions. The treaty with Japan, signed in 1951, was prepared 
outside the Council structures – and it was not signed by, among others, the Soviet Union. 
As the main reason for this decision was considered “going behind the back” of the Council, 
itself intended as  a  body developing proposals of  treaties with all countries-members 
of the Axis during the War. Also some of preparatory work for a peace treaty with Austria 
took place outside the Council of Foreign Ministers – however, all in  all, the provisions 
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of  the Potsdam agreement were in  fact implemented in  the Austrian State Treaty, which 
was finally signed on 15 May 1955. The matter of drafting peace settlements for Germany 
belonged to the core competences of the Council. None of the Council member states ever 
questioned that stipulation, and discussions on  the issue were in  fact present through all 
the sessions of the Council (Klafkowski, 1953, pp. 131-132; Klafkowski, 1960, p. 544).
The most basic, foundation-level principle of  functioning of  the Council of Foreign 
Ministers was unanimity. It was believed, namely, that preservation of peace was possible only 
on the basis of work and effort of all countries, regardless of their size. However, the large 
and powerful countries were burdened with the  greatest responsibility because they had 
greater capabilities than others (Makowski, 1951, pp. 22-23). Furthermore, already in 1944 
at the conference at Dumbarton Oaks, Joseph Stalin declared that the organization which 
in the future would be tasked with perpetuation of peace in the world – that is, the later 
United Nations – could only be effective if the great powers, which had carried the main 
burden of war against Germany, were to work also in the future in the spirit of consensus 
and consent. It would not be effective if this condition was to be breached in any manner 
(Makowski, 1951, p. 149).
The demands for a peace treaty with Germany were also the  focus of other institu-
tions, such as the Allied Control Council, working in parallel with the Council of Foreign 
Ministers. The most important and effective, however, proved to be the efforts of deputy 
foreign ministers of the great powers, which took place in the framework of regular meet-
ings, conferences or sessions. One of the most important events in the entire course of work 
on the matter of Germany turned out to be conference of deputy ministers in London, held 
in January and February 1947. In addition, the issue of Germany was also discussed during 
some bilateral or multi-lateral meetings, such as conferences of socialist countries or Polish-
Czechoslovak conferences as well as so-called summits between the leaders or chiefs of gov-
ernment of  the  victorious powers  – signatories of  the  Potsdam Agreement (Klafkowski, 
1960, p. 512). 
3.  PARTICIPATION OF GERMANY, POLAND AND SO-CALLED  
“SMALL COUNTRIES” 
Agendas of  meetings of  the  Council of  Foreign Ministers were to  a  large extent con-
sumed by procedural issues. Oftentimes, the  crucial problems were becoming secondary 
because the  representatives of  the powers present at meetings could not agree on  formal 
issues. The main issue dividing the debaters were voting rules and the involvement of other 
countries in the preparation of peace treaties.
However, in accordance with the provisions of the Potsdam Agreement (chap. II, art. 3, 
sec. 1 and 2), the task of preparation of peace settlements for Germany and its former al-
lies: Italy, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland fell to these members of the Council 
whose governments previously had signed acts of surrender with these respective countries 
(Makowski, 1946a, p. 5). This provision complemented the general principle that the work 
on preparation of peace treaties is  the responsibility of  the Council of Foreign Ministers, 
consisting of five members: the US, Britain, France, the Soviet Union and China. These 
principles as concerning the  former satellite states of  the Third Reich were confirmed by 
the  representatives of  the  United States, Britain and the  Soviet Union during a  meeting 
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in  Moscow between 16-26 December 1945 (Skibiński, 1987, p.  93; Klafkowski, 1952, 
pp.  18-19; Daszkiewicz, 1967, pp.  316-317). Regardless of  meetings of  the  Council 
of  Foreign Ministers, a  consultative council of  foreign ministers of  the  US, Britain and 
the Soviet Union, established at Yalta and approved in the Potsdam resolutions, functioned 
in parallel. Theoretically, establishment of the Council of Foreign Ministers would not be 
in conflict with the agreements concluded during that conference in  the Crimea, stating 
there should be regular consultation meetings between foreign ministers of the United States 
of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom (Makowski, 
1946a, pp. 7-8). A communiqué informing that the work on peace settlements with Italy, 
Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland would fall to those members of the Council whose 
countries were signatories of the official acts of surrender with these Axis states was pub-
lished on 24 December 1945. Preparation of  the  treaty for Italy was therefore entrusted 
to  representatives of  the  US, UK, USSR and France, while the  treaties for Romania, 
Bulgaria and Hungary were to be drawn up by the foreign ministers of the US, Britain and 
the Soviet Union, with – finally – the treaty for Finland to be created only by the USSR and 
the UK ministers. The above principle according to which the work on peace settlements 
with the  Third Reich allies was partitioned is  referred to  as “formula 4-3-2” of  peace – 
making. It was also decided that all members of the Council would be invited to participate 
in the peace conference, which was meant to include also China and other member states 
of the United Nations, whose numerous troops were involved in the war against the Nazi 
coalition (Skibiński, 1987, pp. 93-94).
Finally, the peace treaties with the German allies were signed on 20 February 1947 
in Paris, and their signatories were both the representatives of the anti-fascist coalition and 
the defeated states. Poland, despite previously taking diplomatic action, was only a signatory 
to the treaty with Italy. On behalf of the Polish Republic, the treaty was signed by the then 
Foreign Minister, Zygmunt Modzelewski (Zięba, 1981, p. 176).
The matter of the peace treaty with Germany turned out to be much more complicated. 
The great powers, and in particular the Soviet Union, would not easily give up the privileges 
possessed, and share the  right to  vote on  issues important for the  future with other 
parties. In  Yalta, during a  session break already on  the very first day of  the  conference 
(i.e. on  4  February 1944), the  matter of  participation of  the  so-called “small countries” 
in decisions concerning the future global order was raised. Stalin stated at the time that some 
countries had forgotten that the great powers had been forced to shed blood to liberate them. 
He did not understand – he claimed – how these states could now scold their liberators for 
not taking into account the  rights of “small countries” (Gardner, 1999, p. 260). He also 
considered ridiculous the fact that Albania would have an equal voice with the great pow-
ers participating in the Crimean conference. Despite everything, however, he was ready – 
for the  sake of peace – to  take into account the voice of  small nations. Roosevelt agreed 
entirely with Stalin, while Churchill, who was aware of Stalin’s imperial ambitions, expressed 
certain – if not very vehement – reservations as to such a solution. He said, specifically, that 
the great powers might set the conditions for peace, but also had to exercise their power 
with moderation and, above all, with great respect for the smaller countries. At that time, 
Andrei Vyshinski, Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR commented to Charles Bohlen – 
diplomat, translator and expert on Soviet matters, and member of the American delegation – 
that the Soviet Union would never agree to the right of the small nations to judge the acts 
of  the  great powers. Bohlen reminded him, however, of  the  importance in  this respect 
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of  the opinion of  the American public. Vyshinski replied only that the American people 
should learn to obey their leaders (Gardner, 1999, p. 261). 
In the  end, the  rules for the  participation of  other countries in  the  preparation 
of  the  treaty for Germany, contained in  the  Potsdam Agreement, have been modified 
and expanded. This change was due to the resolutions agreed upon during the conference 
of  deputy foreign ministers in  London in  January and February 1947, and conclusions 
from two meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers in 1947 – in Moscow and London 
(Klafkowski, 1953, p. 135). 
In November 1946, it was decided that the debate on the treaty for Germany would 
also be joined by – in addition to the great powers – countries which participated actively 
in the fight against Germany as well as neighbors of the German state belonging to the Allied 
coalition (Skibiński, 1987, p. 94). At the end of 1946, it was announced that the Council 
of Foreign Ministers had sent out invitations to  the meeting of deputy foreign ministers 
in London in  January 1947 – these invitations were received by 18 countries: Australia, 
Belgium, Belarus, Brazil, China, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Greece, the Netherlands, India, 
Yugoslavia, Canada, Luxembourg, Norway, New Zealand, Ukraine, the  Union of  South 
Africa and Poland.1 These states were offered the  opportunity to  present their position 
to the debating four great powers. Originally, it was supposed to take the form of submission 
of written memoranda. However, due to  the wide-spread discontent with the conference 
procedure expressed by the invited states, the rules were changed, and individual delegations 
were allowed to present their position both orally and in writing.2
The year 1947 brought a significant cooling in the relations between the formally allied 
powers – it was a time of clear deterioration in the relationship between the former war allies. 
Churchill’s famous speech given in 1946 in Fulton launched the “cold war”. Two distinct 
spheres of influence emerged: the American and the Soviet one, separated by the “iron cur-
tain”. Significant differences of opinion on most of the issues raised became clear, including 
also the plans for the future of Germany.
Despite the apparent differences by then, the great powers for some time yet contin-
ued to declare a common position especially concerning the German question. In practice, 
however, their actions increasingly often only perpetuated the existing divisions. The year 
1947 is  recognized in historiography as  the year when the cooperation between the UK, 
USA and France and the Soviet Union de facto ended. Germany, meanwhile, has become 
a  bargaining chip used by individual states in  the Cold War conflict. None of  the  great 
powers wanted to “surrender” to the will of another, and – and let alone – to give up their 
right to co-decide about the German affairs. So when on 9 June 1946, the US Secretary 
of State James Byrnes confirmed in his speech in Stuttgart that the English and American 
zones of influence will be economically unified, and announced an attempt at re-unifying 
Germany, the  final dissolution of  the  former anti-Hitler coalition became clear to  all 
(Charłamow, Siemionow, 1980, p.  88). In a way, this was an  announcement of  the  end 
 1 Polska zaproszona do Londynu na konferencję w sprawie traktatu pokojowego z Niemcami 
(Poland invited to London for a conference on the peace treaty with Germany). Rzeczpospolita. 
3.01.1947.
 2 Wyjazd delegacji Rządu Polskiego na konferencję w sprawach niemieckich do Londynu 
(Departure of the Polish government delegation to the conference devoted to German issues in 
London). Rzeczpospolita. 11.01.1947.
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of  cooperation between the  US and the  Soviet Union, defining the  borderline between 
the global zones of influence of the US and the USSR for the decades to come.
The above situation was mirrored in the Council of Foreign Ministers. No established 
rules on participation of other countries in the discussions on Germany paralyzed the Council 
deliberations and made decision-making, even on core matters, impossible.
It also seems that in 1947, the  interest of both the United States and Great Britain 
in rapid preparation of a peace treaty with Germany has waned somewhat. Under the terms 
of the Potsdam Agreement, such a treaty would have to concern Germany as a whole, and 
participation of  the  Soviet Union in  its drafting would be inevitable. Thus preparation 
of  such a  treaty would necessitate administrative and economic integration of  the  entire 
German state, and above all  – creation of  a central German government. Logically, also 
the opinion of the USSR would have to be taken into account as the Soviet Union would 
hold a share in control over the new state. Meanwhile, the United States wanted to create 
a separate German state, independent of Soviet influence (Skibiński, 1987, pp. 94-95).
Finally, the  United States changed its stance on  participation of  other countries 
in the preparatory works on a peace treaty with Germany. At both conferences of the Council 
of  Foreign Ministers in  Moscow and London, the  US argued for the  list of  countries 
participating in treaty works to be expanded to  include also countries that were formally 
in a state of war with Germany, but did not take an active part in hostilities. Such a solution 
would mean presence of three groups of countries in the discussions:
1.  A group consisting of  the  four great powers, which would be responsible for 
development of the final draft of the peace treaty;
2.  A group made up of the allied states – neighbors of Germany, whose troops took 
active part in  the war against the Germans. They would participate in  the peace 
conference and cooperate with representatives of  the  major powers in  key treaty 
sub-committees;
3.  A group of countries not participating in hostilities, but remaining in a state of war 
with the Third Reich. This group would be a consulting body, but it was unclear 
what impact on the final decisions would the opinions of the consulted countries 
have (Skibiński, 1987, pp. 95-96).
This meant, in  effect, increasing the number of participating states to 51. This was 
beneficial for the United States as the new list would include South American states heavily 
influenced by, and dependent both politically and economically on the US. At a conference 
in London, the United States presented also an idea of creating an additional fourth group, 
the only member of which would be Germany. Consequently, Germany would have a voice 
in preparing a treaty for herself (Skibiński, 1987, pp. 95-96).
The British government did not provide a detailed concept of integration of countries 
other than the great powers into preparatory work on peace settlements for Germany. The UK 
believed, however, that the conference could be attended by all countries that were at war 
with Germany. The British clearly wanted to reconcile the American and the Soviet concepts 
of the conference. On 3 December 1947, E. Bevin gave an exposé on the subject in London. 
According to him, all the allied countries – in addition to the big four – should be invited 
to participate in the peace conference – both the neighbors of Germany and the countries 
that were engaged militarily in hostilities against the Third Reich. In addition, the  states 
that were in the state of war with Germany and the former Axis countries which in the final 
phase declared war upon Germany should have the right to present their opinion. However, 
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the final say on whether these countries would be permitted to participate in the discussion 
would rest with those countries whose participation in  the  conference was indisputable 
(Klafkowski, 1953, p. 136; Skibiński, 1987, p. 97).
The French government initially argued for the division of participating countries into 
two groups:
1.  A group of  countries that have declared war on  Germany  – for the  French, this 
meant engaging actively in wartime hostilities;
2.  A group of  countries that only broke off diplomatic relations with Germany 
(Klafkowski, 1953, p. 137; Skibiński, 1987, p. 98).
However, under the  influence of  the US, the French government softened its posi-
tion. On 3 December 1947, during the London Conference, the French Foreign Minister 
Georges Bidault stated that participation in the treaty preparation works must in the first 
place be entrusted to countries that actively participated in the war, and had a vested, direct 
interest in  the  future of  Germany. A secondary role would belong to  those states which 
only formally remained in a state of war with Germany, but did not get involved militarily. 
The French thought, moreover, that these countries should also be allowed to participate 
in the conference itself, and not only in the preparatory work (Klafkowski, 1953, p. 137; 
Skibiński, 1987, p. 98).
The USSR did not want to  increase the  number of  countries participating in  trea-
ty works. On 26 November 1947, Vyacheslav Molotov commented on  the issue during 
the London session of the Council of Foreign Ministers. He recalled that at the New York 
conference of  the  Council, it  was decided unanimously what states should be invited 
to  the  initial discussions on  the preparation of  a peace treaty with Germany. Namely, 
these were the countries neighboring Germany and belonging to the Allied coalition, and 
other allied countries whose military forces were involved in  the  war against Germany. 
He expressed surprise at the sudden emergence of suggested solutions completely contrary 
to these previous resolutions of the Council of Foreign Ministers in New York. He added 
that if the powers did not want to undermine what had been agreed between them, they 
must uphold the decisions made in New York. This would, in his opinion, uncomplicate 
the issue of participation in meetings on the preparation of peace settlements as well as solve 
the matter of composition of the conference itself (Mołotow, 1950, p. 390). Representatives 
of  the  Soviet Union consistently claimed that in  addition to  the  great powers, the work 
on the treaty for Germany could be possibly, shared also with those countries which actively 
participated in World War II. This, according to the Soviet Union, ruled out participation 
of, for example Turkey, which limited itself to  formally declaring a  state of  war with 
Germany. Apart from this empty gesture, Turkey did not give the allied coalition any support 
in the war with Germany, and – furthermore – also supported the Germans in their fighting 
against the Soviet Union. Soviet diplomats prepared their own list of possible participants 
in the peace conference on Germany, and divided them into two groups:
1. The group of great powers: the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, the US, 
France and China; 2. A group of  allied countries neighboring Germany and 
of allied countries whose forces were involved in  the common struggle against 
the Germans: Albania, Australia, Belgium, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, 
Brazil, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Greece, India, Luxembourg, 
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the  Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist 
Republic, the Union of South Africa, Yugoslavia (Mołotow, 1950, p. 394).
The situation was similar in  the  case of  membership of  the  subsidiary bodies 
of  the  Council of  Foreign Ministers. To address the  specific issues associated with 
the preparation of the treaty, on 20 March 1947, at the Moscow Conference, four separate 
committees were established: for political issues and political reorganization of Germany; 
for territorial issues and related problems; for economic issues including war reparations, 
disarmament and demilitarization. Ultimately, however, no consensus was reached either 
in  Moscow or in  London as  to  who had the  right to  participate in  the  work of  these 
committees – should representatives of only the great powers, or also of other countries be 
eligible?
For Poland, its participation in the talks on German issues, especially in the conference 
of deputy foreign ministers in London in January and February 1947 seemed obvious (Kącka, 
2005, pp. 589-602). Poland was, after all, the first country to militarily resist the German 
aggression, and Polish soldiers fought on almost all fronts of  the Second World War not 
only for the freedom of their country, but also that of other states. This understanding was 
confirmed in the Potsdam Agreement whose paragraph 2 stated that whenever the Council 
would be considering a question of direct interest to a state not represented therein, such state 
should be invited to send representatives who would be able to participate in the discussion 
and analysis of  that matter (Kocot, Wolfke, 1987, p. 16; Charłamow, Siemionow, 1980, 
p. 87). Guided by these provisions, already on 14 November 1946 the Polish authorities 
sent a note to the foreign ministers of the US, Britain and France – at the time debating 
in New York. The note contained the request to allow the Polish side to present their views 
and participate in the deliberations of the conference of foreign ministers concerning these 
issues associated with the preparation of a peace treaty with Germany which also impacted 
Polish interests.3
The above request for admission of the Polish delegation to the the London Conference 
meetings was received on 14 November 1946 also by the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
In response, the People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Vyacheslav Molotov, 
expressed enthusiastic support for the participation of Poles in  the debate.4 The London 
meeting was, however, the first and also the last opportunity for so many countries to gather 
together, bringing diverse voices, but all concerned about the  future of  Germany and 
establishment of peace in Europe.
At the same time, ever since the meeting of representatives of the great powers at the Yalta 
conference it was clear that after the possible victory of the Allies, Germany would not be 
allowed to have a voice in discussions on the future of their country. Decisions on matters 
concerning Germany were to be thrust upon them by the victorious states. This position 
of  the great four was confirmed again at the Potsdam Conference – hence, for example, 
the repetitive phrase “a settlement for Germany” appearing in different documents.
 3 Postulat w pełni uzasadniony (A well-justified postulate). Rzeczpospolita. 18.11.1946.
 4 Archiwum Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych (Archives of  the  Ministry of  Foreign Affairs). 
Gabinet Ministra (Minister’s Office). reference 15/230/22, Pismo Wiaczesława Mołotowa z dnia 
23.11.1946 r. (A letter from Vyacheslav Molotov dated 23 November 1946).
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However, in  accordance with the  Potsdam Agreement, the  possible adoption 
by Germany of  the  treaty prepared specially for that state, which meant at least partial 
restoration of German sovereignty.
The victorious powers met several times to discuss the matter of Germany – mainly 
in  1947. As  the  beginning of  the  official debate on  the future of  the  German state can 
be regarded the meeting of deputy foreign ministers of  the  four powers in  January 1947 
(Stolarczyk, 1989, p. 69; Stolarczyk, 1986, pp. 93-111; Klafkowski, 1952, pp. 21-22).
4. CONCLUSION
The day of 8 May 1945, when the Third Reich signed her unconditional surrender, closed one 
of the most tragic periods in the history of the twentieth century. The war, which involved 
all of the most important states on the planet, which claimed millions of victims, brought 
destruction and created new forms of warfare and new ways of mass extermination of entire 
peoples ended. The perception of war as  a means of  resolving disputes and international 
conflicts has changed irreversibly. This global war forced the leaders of superpowers to reflect 
on the future of the world, and develop solutions to ensure that such a tragedy would not 
happen again.
The Second World War also changed Germany. Not only all representatives 
of the coalition, but also Germany itself, had no doubt that the aggressors must bear the full 
consequences of their actions. While individual states had different (often substantially) ideas 
as to what form and shape should these consequences and reparations take, all of them – 
from the  largest to  the  smallest  – wanted to  participate in  co-deciding about the  future 
of Germany. Among such countries was also Poland. Unfortunately, despite the efforts made, 
the most important decision remained still in the hands of the representatives of the great 
powers.
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